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The COMETR project is a comprehensive attempt to account ex-post for the implications of 
 carbon-energy taxation, taking into account differences in sectoral tax burdens and  within a 
 suitable macro-economic framework capable of providing an overall assessment, the E3ME 
 model of Cambridge Econometrics. The results indicate reductions in greenhouse gas  emissions 
for six member states as a result of carbon-energy taxation under revenue- neutral  environmental 
tax  reform (ETR). These effects are mirrored by reductions in total fuel  consumption, with the 
largest reductions occurring in countries with the highest tax rates.  Accordingly, the  European 
environmental tax reforms had by 2004 caused reductions in greenhouse gas emissions of 
3.1% on average for the six member countries examined, with the largest fall recorded for 
 Finland (5.9%). E3ME-results also suggest that ETR-countries did not experience marked 
 impacts on  economic growth (GDP). There was a negative effect for energy-intensive industries 
but due to many  exemptions the burden has remained modest and, where revenues have been 
recycled to lower employers’ costs for social security contributions,  generally below 2% of gross 
 operating surplus.
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The disappointment over outcomes in Copenhagen has in 
certain countries reverberated on unilateral efforts towards 
factoring in carbon costs in energy prices. The French gov-
ernment, which had announced a carbon tax at 17 euro/ton 
CO
2
, backed out from the initiative following judicial concerns 
that more than 90 per cent of industrial emissions were to be 
exempted. The Irish government, on the other hand, recently 
did implement a domestic carbon tax (at a rate of 15 euro/
ton CO
2
). No unilateral measure will of course tackle climate 
change per se and it can also be argued that a low tax mainly 
addressing households and private transport will have limited 
impact on carbon emissions. However, all tax changes come 
gradually and limited unilateral measures may offer prospects 
for the longer term, in particular if more countries implement 
comparable systems for pricing of carbon. 
Competitiveness vis-à-vis emerging economies, in  particular 
China, is at the heart of concerns over carbon leakage with 
emissions pricing approaches. Some policy-makers in 
 Europe now propose that a border-tax adjustment should be 
introduced for products imported from non-annex-1 coun-
tries without carbon reduction commitments, and WTO’s 
secretariat has indicated that under certain conditions com-
patibility with international trade law could be obtained for 
such schemes (WTO & UNEP, 2009). 
However, while on one hand China rejects to accept  binding 
caps on its carbon emissions under international agreement, 
it pursues vigorously energy savings and promotion of renew-
able energy in order to sustain its high economic growth-rates. 
China is since 2007 no longer self supplying with energy, and it 
is clear to its leadership that suficient energy supply is a real 
bottleneck to its continued economic growth, and in turn to 
its political stability. With continued  annual growth rates above 
10 per cent China will in less than a decade have doubled its 
energy consumption, unless energy productivity improves. 
State regulated prices on gasoline, coal and gas have in recent 
years been increased, whereby the gap to world market pric-
es has been closed. Even a  system for carbon taxation (Task 
Force, 2009) is under consideration and has been receiving 
serious attention in the process of preparing the next 5 year 
plan. The purpose of this survey paper is to present experienc-
es with carbon-energy taxation obtained in northern Europe, 
as not only in European countries but also in several Asian 
countries carbon-energy taxation is now for some time on the 
decision-making agenda. Analysis of the  experiences obtained 
from actual experiments with  carbon taxes is a  useful comple-
ment to insights from ex-ante  economic modelling.
Finland (1990), Sweden (1990), Norway (1991) and Denmark 
(1992) have been frontrunners in launching speciic CO
2
- 
taxes to curb CO
2
 emissions (Andersen, 2004). Concerns over 
climate change coincided with policies in these countries 
aiming at reducing income taxes—and by addressing these 
two issues in combination a series of tax shifting  packages 
were created, which have been in the main revenue-neutral. 
Netherlands (1996) and Slovenia (1997) followed the policy 
trend a few years later, and towards the close of the 1990s 
two of the largest EU economies, Germany (1998) and UK 
(2000) introduced carbon-energy taxation policies too, 
 adding more weight and signiicance to the approach. While 
UK introduced a speciic climate change levy on fossil fuels, 
Germany increased more broadly its energy taxes as part 
of a so-called ‘ecological tax reform’. 
The implication for the European economy as a whole has 
been the shifting of an annual tax bill of more than 25  billion 
euro—these taxes having been converted mainly from  labour 
taxes to what is here termed ‘carbon-energy’ taxes. The 
 reforms  involved shifting taxes amounting for up to 1.1% of 
GDP; highest in Denmark, Sweden and Germany.1 
Equity issues igure prominently in all considerations over 
tax policy and the environmental tax shifting has in European 
countries been accompanied with tailor-made compensations 
for vulnerable subgroups, such as pensioners, unemployed 
and families with many children. Taxes related to heating 
 fuels and end-use of electricity tend to be regressive and have 
warranted compensating measures, such as targeted ‘green 
checks’. Overall, however, VAT is found to be three times more 
regressive than environmentally related taxes as a whole. 
 Detailed studies have demonstrated that taxes related to 
gasoline and vehicles are in fact progressive, as high-salary 
earners—unsurprisingly—tend to drive in relatively more 
 expensive and fuel-consuming vehicles than do low-salary 
earners (Jacobsen et al., 2001:74).
A considerable number of studies have been carried out 
to determine the broader environmental and economic 
implica tions of introducing carbon-energy taxes (for an ini-
tial  survey see Andersen (2004)). In contrast to the 1990s, 
where mainly  ex-ante modelling studies prevailed (such as 
Carraro and Soubeyran, 1996; Harrison and Kriström, 1997; 
Bach et al., 2002), the focus has in recent years been towards 
better empirically based ex-post studies that, by employing 
a range of analytical approaches and modelling techniques, 
attempt to disentangle the actual impacts of carbon- energy 
 taxation ( Enevoldsen et al., 2007; Agnolucci, 2009). It is no 
small challenge to igure out the impact of a speciic tax 
measure when considering a time-series of observations 
for, say,  greenhouse gas emissions, energy consumption and 
economic performance. With an ex-ante model, strong as-
sumptions are often involved, including perfect competition 
and fully rational  actors, while the results will depend on 
the values of a range of intermediate variables, for instance 
what is assumed about economic growth or about ongoing 
structural change in the composition of the manufacturing 
sector. With an  ex-post  approach the analyst is constrained 
by the actual  historical data, but nevertheless must employ 
stringent analytical  methods of econometric nature, that al-
low for attribution to the speciic impacts of the tax increase, 
as further explained in the  section below. 
1 Following ETR carbon-energy taxes comprise 4.5-6.8% of total taxes in these countries, amounting to 1.8-2.6% of GDP. In addition there are transport and 
 pollution  taxes in place. http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/taxation/gen_info/economic_analysis/tax_structures/index_en.htm Accessed: 2011-01-07. (Archived 
by  WebCite® at http://www.webcitation.org/5vYrPBe87)
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According to basic behavioural and economic theory carbon-
energy taxes are expected to curb emissions and improve on 
energy productivity. Controversy accompanies the broader 
macro-economic implications of carbon-energy taxation, 
including for competitiveness, employment and economic 
growth. The misty character of this debate would appear to 
some extent to stem from the heat of vested interests, as 
in fact a degree of consensus has emerged concerning the 
properties of environmental tax reforms that are speciically 
revenue-neutral, c.f. overview of theoretical debate in part II 
below. In a inal section this article addresses the differences 
between taxing and trading carbon, and considers possible 
implications of double-regulation due to the co-existence of 
the European Union’s emissions trading system (ETS) with 
the unilateral schemes of carbon-energy taxation in individual 
EU member countries. 
1. IMPlICaTIONS OF CaRbON-ENERGY 
TaXaTION FOR CO2 EMISSIONS  
aND ENERGY CONSUMPTION 
Basically one expects carbon-energy taxes to provide incen-
tives in two directions; a demand effect whereby the demand 
for energy is reduced as a result of the price increase caused 
by the tax; and a substitution effect whereby carbon fuels are 
substituted by low-carbon or carbon-neutral fuels that are 
taxed at lower rates. As reduced energy demand may relect 
either a lowering of output or actual energy savings it is often 
more appropriate to monitor energy intensity. In other words 
we would expect to see changes in energy intensity as well as 
carbon intensity as a result of carbon pricing.
While some analysts have suggested that a global carbon 
price will need to be increased to a level of 30-40 euro/ton 
CO
2
 by 2020 to stabilise atmospheric concentrations (Barker, 
2007), the price at which CO
2
 is traded under the cap in the 
 European ETS is presently about 15 euro/ton.2 Unilaterally 
applied  carbon-energy taxes in individual EU member states 
have been more modest and for industries range  generally 
from a low, to some extent symbolic level (for the most 
 energy-intensive industries) up to approximately 25 euro/ton 
in the case of  Sweden and Finland. Denmark is exceptional 
with a tax on  energy consumed for heating purposes (includ-
ing for industries) at an effective rate of about 80 euro/ton CO
2
.
In evaluating the impact of carbon-energy taxes on CO
2
 
emissions a complicating factor is that in some cases they 
have replaced pre-existing energy taxes, and now come un-
der a  different name and with a modiied tax base according 
to  carbon content rather than energy content. Sweden, for 
instance, has had taxes on industrial energy consumption in 
place already since 1974, which then were modiied in 1990 
towards a CO
2
 tax base. 
Whereas in Germany and UK carbon-energy taxes were intro-
duced only from the end of the 1990s, the four Nordic countries 
and the Netherlands, with time series of more than a decade, 
generally provide the irmest basis for ex-post assessment. 
Slovenia has a longer timeline too, but as a country in transi-
tion, one associated with data and conversion dificulties. 
It goes without saying that carbon-energy taxes are not 
(yet) applied across-the-board with uniform rates for all 
 emitters and fuels. Over time countries have adjusted tax 
rates and tax bases, so as to achieve carbon-energy  taxes 
more in  accordance with theoretical prescriptions, but in 
the short run pragmatic considerations have prevailed. 
For this  reason  effective fuel tax rates vary considerably 
from sector to  sector and while it is not always immedi-
ately clear what kind of  exemptions, liability caps or special 
 arrangements that  speciic industries or target groups have 
 obtained, these circumstances are of course crucial when 
a proper ex-post evaluation of impacts and effectiveness is 
to be made. 
The COMETR project3 (Andersen et al., 2007; Andersen and 
Ekins, 2009) is a comprehensive attempt to account ex-post 
for the implications of carbon-energy taxation, taking into ac-
count differences in sectoral tax burdens—in addition to other 
complications indicated above. In order to tackle the speciic 
challenge of disentangling and attributing the speciic impact 
of the tax shift COMETR relies on a suitable macro- economic 
framework: the E3ME model of Cambridge  Econometrics 
which is a comprehensive time-series esti mated macro- 
economic model of economy-energy- environment relations 
within the EU, which also can account for EU trade relations 
with the rest of the world4. For the purposes of  modeling 
changes in fuel consumption and CO
2
 emissions as a result 
of relative price changes and feed-backs in the economy, the 
model has a high resolution, featuring here eleven different 
fuels and more than 40 economic sectors. 
E3ME is overall an empirically oriented, data-rich model, 
which does not employ assumptions about a long-tem  general 
equilibrium in the economy, and which hence is strongest 
in analysing trends in the short—and medium term. The 
COMETR project carefully improved and sharpened the mod-
eling base of E3ME by retrieving country-speciic data for 
carbon and  energy taxes, including all the relevant sector- 
speciic  exemption arrangements, in order to be able to model 
and disentangle the impacts with E3ME. 
In order to tease out the speciic impact of the tax shifting, two 
scenarios were set up in E3ME. First, a ‘baseline case’ was 
calibrated constrained by historical data to match  observed 
outcomes over the period from 1994-2003 for all seven coun-
tries with environmental tax reform (ETR) and the rest of the 
EU. Second, a ‘counterfactual reference case’ scenario was 
modeled, which basically involved a projection of ‘what if’ 
there had been no tax shifting as a result of environmental tax 
reform, keeping everything else in the model constant (Barker 
et al., 2009).
2 See http://www.pointcarbon.com/ Accessed: 2011-01-07. (Archived by WebCite® at http://www.webcitation.org/5vYqlEY9L)
3 COMETR was supported by a grant from the European Union’s Sixth Framework Programme for Research and the author of the present article was its scientiic coordinator. 
(FP-6 contract no. 501993). http://ec.europa.eu/research/fp6/ssp/cometr_en.htm). Accessed: 2011-01-14. (Archived by WebCite® at http://www.webcitation.org/5vjT4o52N)
4 http://www.camecon.com/ModellingTraining/suite_economic_models/E3ME.aspx Accessed: 2011-01-07. (Archived by WebCite® at http://www.webcitation.org/5vYs5lrMK)
4Mikael Skou Andersen Europe’s experience with carbon-energy taxation
Andersen | P4
By subtracting the outcome of the ‘what if no ETR’ case 
from the historical case it became possible to disentangle 
and  attribute the speciic impact of the carbon-energy taxes 
 introduced under the revenue-neutral ETR. 
The model has information for historical energy tax burdens 
prior to the introduction of the carbon-energy taxes, and 
hence E3ME can account for the speciic impact only of the 
 additional carbon-energy taxes introduced—and the asso-
ciated tax shifting. The 25 billion euro in new carbon-energy 
taxes came on top of pre-existing energy taxes amounting to 
about 80 billion euro annually. Exemptions, non-payments 
and negotiated agreements for speciic industrial sectors 
are included as accurately as possible as they happened, 
subject to the total revenues matching the published igures 
in each case. 
In summary, E3ME illustrates the difference between what 
did happen and what would have happened had there been 
no ETR. As any modelling exercise it is a ‘best guess’, but the 
model is well suited to the purpose.
In addition to analysing the historical period from 1994-2003, 
E3ME also included a projection for the period up to 2012. 
During this period, forecast increases in energy prices as 
well as the introduction of the EU’s emissions trading scheme 
inluence results. Both the ex-post and ex-ante parts of the 
modelling were undertaken with the same set of equations, 
for instance for the labour market wage formation (Barker et 
al., 2009:166).
According to the estimations six countries show a  reduction 
in fuel demand that results from the ETR (see Figure 1). 
The size of this reduction is dependent both on the tax rates 
 imposed (how they are applied to the various fuels and fuel 
user groups, how easy it is for fuel users to substitute be-
tween the various fuel types and non-fuel inputs) and the 
scale of the secondary effects from resulting changes in 
economic activity. On average the reduction in fuel demand 
estimated for 2004 was 2.6% in six ETR-countries although 
it was slightly higher in Finland than the other countries. No 
reduction was identiied in Slovenia, which in fact mainly 
 relabelled its pre-existing mineral oils tax into a CO
2
-tax. 
We would expect to see a reduction in greenhouse gas emis-
sions from lower consumption, but total emissions will also 
depend on the relative consumption levels of each fuel type. 
For example, a tax system that encourages the use of coal is 
likely to produce higher emissions than one that encourages 
the use of natural gas or biofuels. E3ME includes explicit 
equations for fuel shares of hard coal, heavy oil, natural 
gas and electricity. Assumptions are made about the other 
fuel types linking them to the closest modeled alternative 
(e.g. other coal is linked to hard coal, crude oil to heavy 
oil). For middle distillates (petrol, diesel, etc.), demand is 
linked to  total fuel demand by sector. The reason for this is 
that  demand for these fuels is dominated by the transport 
 sectors. This sector does not generally use any other fuels, 
so fuel share equations are not required.
The scenario results indicate that there are reductions in 
greenhouse gases for six member states as a result of the ETR 
(see Figure 2). The effects closely follow the results for total 
fuel consumption, with the largest reductions  estimated for 
the countries with the highest tax rates.  Finland and  Sweden, 
for example, experience the largest reductions in emissions, 
in most cases exceeding the decline in fuel  demand, provid-
ing evidence for the eficiency of ETR in reducing emissions. 
In contrast, the German ETR was not particularly eficient in 
 reducing emissions as it did not include coal. According to 
E3ME the European environmental tax reforms had by 2004 
caused reductions in greenhouse gas emissions of 3.1% on 
average for the six member countries examined, with the 
largest fall recorded for Finland (5.9%).
Enevoldsen (2005) studied Danish and Dutch experiences 
with carbon-energy taxation and matched outcomes against 
developments in Austria, a country that has introduced nei-
ther market-based instruments nor ETR. Denmark’s policy 
of ETR began in 1992, whereas the Netherlands introduced 
its ETR only in 1996 after some years promoting voluntary 
Figure 1: The effect of ETR on total fuel demand (note: % diffe rence 
between the base case and the counterfactual reference case). 
Source: Cambridge Econometrics.
Figure 2: The effect of ETR on GHG emissions (note: % difference 
between the base case and the counterfactual reference case). 
Source: Cambridge Econometrics.
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long-term agreements with industry. In Denmark,  industry 
improved  energy intensity by close to 30% in the decade 
from 1990-2000, whereas the Netherlands and Austria 
 obtained improvements in the range of 10-15%. A particular 
aspect of Denmark’s  program of carbon-energy taxation, 
believed to have been  signiicant for the marked impacts 
on energy productivity, was the earmarking of 20% of the 
revenues to co-inance  energy eficiency measures and 
upgrade production technology. These funds were made 
available in a  Danish Energy Agency supervised program. 
Auditors provided an  independent review of company energy 
practices and made recommendations for improvements as 
well as for  investments based on up to four year returns. 
For  Denmark,  Enevoldsen et al. (2007) found somewhat 
larger CO
2
- reductions in industry than the E3ME-model, 
which does not attribute effects to the speciic energy- 
eficiency earmarking of revenues. Still, Bjørner and Togeby 
(1999) have conirmed that companies participating under 
the  Danish program undertook more substantial  energy 
 savings than companies subject to the tax only, on average 
60%  extra. 
2. IMPlICaTIONS FOR COMPETITIVENESS 
aND ECONOMIC PERFORMaNCE
2.1 THE THEORETICal DEbaTE ON TaX SHIFTS
Harvard economist Michael Porter argued in ‘The  Competitive 
Advantage of Nations’ (1990) that, contrary to conventional 
wisdom, environmental policies may encourage process—or 
product-oriented innovation and improve competitiveness, in 
particular when anticipating requirements that will spread 
 internationally (Porter and van der Linde, 1995; Porter, 1998). 
From a few initial remarks in his book Porter elaborated the 
argument and cautioned that many environmental regulations 
presently violate the principles for a positive impact on com-
petitiveness as they involve command-and-control require-
ments for speciic pre-deined technologies, often end-of-
pipe, rather than leaving room for adaptation, lexibility and 
innovation. References to the Porter hypothesis in the litera-
ture tend to neglect that use of market-based instruments 
for environmental policy implementation is the premise for 
improvements in competitiveness (Porter, 1991). Although 
in real world company management the challenge to identify 
and harvest the readily available savings persists, there was 
vigorous controversy in the 1990s over Porter’s claims that 
there were indeed ‘low-hanging ten-pound notes’ that had not 
been picked up by business.
David Pearce (1991) called attention to the possible ‘double 
dividend’ feature of carbon-energy taxes, by which he re-
ferred to the improvement in social welfare that could arise 
if taxation was shifted from ‘goods’ to ‘bads’—e.g. from 
 labour to carbon. Since environmental taxes serve to  correct 
market failures, by deinition they do not share the distort-
ing properties of many other taxes. By adopting a iscally 
 neutral  package that exchanges existing taxes for carbon-
energy taxes, the opportunity arises to reap positive beneits 
in terms of a higher employment rate, which may improve 
short-term economic performance, while also  delivering a 
long-term environmental dividend. David Pearce’s approach 
was soon adopted in the famous  European Commission 
White Paper that argued a shift in taxation in order both to 
reap the short—and the long-term dividends (Commission 
of the European Communities, 1993). However, complica-
tions arise where environmental taxes are introduced in the 
 realistic context of pre-existing taxes that are distorting to 
the economy.
Many economists have had dificulties with the ‘free lunch’ 
implied in the double dividend argument as well as with 
the rhetoric on the win-win options of environmental policy 
 applied by its adherents and as a consequence Goulder (1995) 
proposed to differentiate between weak and strong versions 
of the double dividend argument. The strong version is the 
claim that any environmental tax that replaces another tax 
will by deinition improve social welfare, which is regarded as 
a  controversial claim. The weak version, on the other hand, 
focuses on the revenue-recycling aspect and states that once 
environmental taxes have been introduced, using revenues to 
reduce distortional taxes is preferable to a lump-sum return 
of revenues—merely to reduce on the pure costs and not a 
controversial claim. An intermediate version of the double divi-
dend argument implies, according to Goulder, that whether 
overall social welfare will indeed be improved as a result of 
ETR depends on the speciic properties of the distortional tax 
which is being replaced with an environmental tax—in other 
words whether the sign of the costs is positive or negative 
 depends on context and circumstances of the speciic tax shift 
in question. Many have accepted this call for a much more 
careful examination of the opportunities for a double dividend, 
which also was a lead for the COMETR project to examine 
 outcomes of ETRs in Europe.
Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994) have pointed to the existence 
of a possible ‘tax interaction effect’, according to which the 
costs of environmental taxes will cause commodity prices 
to increase, lowering the real value of after-tax income. 
As  relief on income taxation provided under ETR could be 
too small to offset the price increases, the resulting loss 
in workers’  purchasing power in turn will cause  employees 
to either lower their labour (or productivity) supply or lead 
to demands for  salary increases that in turn will trigger in-
lation. In  essence, the negative tax interaction effect will 
usually exceed the positive revenue-recycling effect,  except 
under special circumstances where highly distortional 
taxes are replaced. The  formal argument hinges on the 
crucial  assumption that income taxation a priori minimises 
the  excess tax burden, as well as on the presumption that 
ETR is introduced on top of existing environmental taxes 
or regulations that suficiently internalise externalities 
( Weinbrenner, 1996). 
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There is much to suggest that many of the analyses that focus 
on the tax interaction effect are too stylised and restrictive. 
Bovenberg and de Mooij’s irst article was based on a static 
model. In a second article where they explore the relation-
ships in the context of a dynamic model, the indings are re-
laxed somewhat: if the ETR leads to lower regulatory pressure 
on companies then a double dividend may arise (Bovenberg 
and de Mooij, 1997). Nielsen et al. (1995) explore the double 
dividend hypothesis with a dynamic model that includes un-
employment. They show that unemployment will be reduced 
if a pollution tax is introduced. In this case the tax interaction 
effect also inluences the value of the unemployment beneit, 
causing more unemployed to enter the labour market. The 
overall effect on the rate of economic growth could, however, 
still become negative. Goodstein (2003) questions the basic 
assumption of the tax interaction effect that higher prices 
will reduce labour supply, as in empirical studies based on 
micro-data the relationship is found to be ambiguous. When 
dual wage earner families are considered, higher prices are 
seen to lead to an increase in labour supply, as workers seek 
to compensate the reduction in family income generated by 
the price increases (Gustafson and Hadley, 1989). 
The concerns over the direction and magnitude of the tax 
 interaction effect relate to the labour market implications 
of swapping labour taxes for environmental taxes, mostly 
where income taxes are in focus for reductions. Where the 
tax shift targets employers’ payroll taxes, such as the com-
pulsory social security contributions, the implications will 
be different. Provided that the net increase in environmental 
taxes is offset by a lowering of payroll taxes, a pass-over in 
product prices will not be required and the labour market 
implications for real wages need not materialise. Ekins and 
Barker (2003)  argue that in this speciic case one would not 
expect a negative tax interaction effect from ETR.
2.2 REVENUE RECYClING PROGRaMS
In view of the theoretical debate it is interesting that 
 European countries have practised different strategies 
for revenue recycling:
• Sweden and Finland have mainly recycled revenue by 
lowering income taxes. For Sweden it has for many 
years been a tax policy aim to lower the pressure of 
income taxation on labour. The tax reforms in these 
two countries have aimed at lowering direct income 
 taxes, and the carbon-energy taxes have contributed 
to  securing alternative revenues for some, but not all, 
of the income tax reductions. This observation applies 
for  Sweden’s early environmental tax reform (1990) as 
well as the most  recent phase (after 2001). It also ap-
plies to  Finland for the more comprehensive tax shifts 
introduced since 1996. It would have been dificult for 
both countries to follow the recommendations from the 
iscal literature to aim reductions at employers’ social 
security  contributions, because such contributions are 
relatively small in both countries.
• Denmark and the UK, on the other hand, have  followed 
the recommendations from the iscal  conventionalists 
more closely, inasmuch as revenues have been aimed 
predominantly at a lowering of employers’  social se-
curity contributions, so as to avoid inlationary  effects. 
However, because of the imbalance between energy 
consumption on the one hand and number of employ-
ees on the other, lowering social security contributions 
at the  company level does not necessarily lead to full 
compensation for the individual company. In Denmark 
as well as in the UK the imbalance has been then miti-
gated via various mechanisms for energy-intensive 
industries, such as agreements and reduced rates for 
heavy industries. The real purpose of the exemptions 
seems to have been to avoid the tax interaction effects. 
Finally, both countries have earmarked some revenues 
(5-20%) for direct energy eficiency subsidies, e.g. via 
the  Carbon Trust (UK), perhaps out of concerns that 
 incentives would otherwise be too weak.
• The Netherlands and Germany have followed ‘mixed’ 
approaches. The Dutch reduced income taxation in the 
initial phase, and a particular issue here was  social 
 concerns, which led to an increase in the basic tax 
free allowance for income as well as to complicated 
formulae for exempting basic consumption of elec-
tricity and gas (Vermeend and van der Vaart, 1998). In 
the second phase the Dutch adhered more to the side 
of iscal  conventionalists and reduced the employers’ 
payroll taxes, but they also reduced corporate taxes. 
In Germany the ecological tax reform split the revenue 
recycling equally between a reduction in employers’ 
and in employees’ social  security contributions, there-
by establishing a program of revenue recycling less 
concerned with iscal orthodoxy and more with politi-
cal appeal, taking into account that the eco-tax reform 
aimed equally at gasoline prices and other fuels.
We can summarise the revenue recycling approaches by 
dividing the member states in question into three different 
groups: the iscal conventionalists (UK and Denmark), the 
iscal pragmatists (Sweden and Finland) and inally the po-
litical pragmatists (Netherlands and Germany). The political 
pragmatists are so labeled because reforms were designed 
so as to accommodate the pressing concerns with the tax 
systems and the electorate, rather than iscal theory.
2.3 MaCRO-ECONOMIC RESUlTS
European countries that implemented ETR did not experi-
ence negative implications for their economic growth (GDP); 
 according to E3ME estimations there was a small  effect 
amounting overall to economic growth for one  quarter 
(see Figure 3). In Sweden, the effects took slightly longer 
to come through, as the very large increase in household 
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 electricity taxes  depressed real incomes in the short run. 
Finland  experienced a short-term boost to GDP from the 
 effects of the taxes on fuel demand, because a reduction in 
the  demand for imported fuel improved the country’s trade 
 balance (Barker et al., 2009).
As ETR results in higher fuel prices it is considered likely that 
there will be an increase in the overall price level. The degree 
of this is likely to be dependent on the scale of the increase 
in fuel costs, how easy it is for industry and consumers to 
switch between fuels to cheaper alternatives (and non-energy 
inputs), and how much of the cost is passed by industry on to 
consumers (this is dependent on the level of competition in the 
industry, which is estimated econometrically for each  region 
and sector). It should also be noted that revenue recycling 
may have a delationary effect when the revenues are  recycled 
through reductions in employers’ social security contributions 
(i.e. labour costs). This is demonstrated for  Germany in  Figure 
4 below (where just under half the revenues were used for 
reducing employers’ contributions). In Denmark and the UK 
there were no signiicant increases in the overall price index. 
In the UK this is because the tax was relatively small and was 
compensated by slightly cheaper labour costs. In Denmark 
the tax was larger but again was compensated by lower labour 
costs (see Figure 5). 
The measure of inlation, the consumer price index, will 
 record a larger increase in cases where the taxes are  levied 
on households rather than industry. The reason for this is that 
the consumer price index is a weighted average of the price 
of consumer products, including energy. In the  cases where 
the tax is levied on households the whole tax is relected in 
the consumer price index rather than just the share that is 
passed on by industry. Therefore it is not  unexpected that 
the largest increases in the consumer price index are seen 
in the Netherlands and, in particular, Sweden (see Figure 5).
Except for the Netherlands and Sweden, the countries with 
full or part revenue recycling via income taxation, the  impact 
on the consumer price index is negligible. The Swedish 
 experience suggests that combining carbon-energy taxes 
on households with reductions in income taxes could cause 
 inlation rates at a level triggering a possible tax interaction 
effect, but further analysis is required to corroborate this. The 
logic behind the ETR implemented in the UK and  Denmark 
is that there is no discernable effect on the consumer price 
 index; this is because the revenue recycling here is mainly 
via lowering of social security contributions.
2.4 ENERGY-INTENSIVE INDUSTRIES
A complication arises with energy-intensive companies, 
 because the compensation they receive via the reduction 
in  social security contributions does not fully match the 
 additional energy costs. They often have a small labour stock, 
while they consume large amounts of energy. Their  sensitivity 
depends on the degree to which they use carbon-intensive 
fuels. In Sweden, Finland and Slovenia the energy-intensive 
industries beneit from the availability of hydropower and 
 nuclear power, and so are less sensitive to carbon-based 
energy taxes. However, in other member states complicated 
schemes have been designed to balance, cap or reduce the 
tax burden of energy-intensive industries. 
EU guidelines (European Commission, 2001) offer certain 
 opportunities for reducing the tax rates of energy- intensive 
 industries, especially if these are higher than the EU’s 
Figure 3: The effect of ETR on GDP (note: % difference be-
tween the base case and the counterfactual reference case). 
Source: Cambridge Econometrics.
Figure 4: The price effect of ETR in Germany (note: % difference 
between the base case and the counterfactual reference case). 
Source: Cambridge Econometrics.
Figure 5: The effect of ETR on inlation (note: % difference 
 between the base case and the counterfactual reference case). 
Source: Cambridge Econometrics.
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minimum tax rates. These opportunities are to some ex-
tent  modeled on the basis of the 1995 decision regarding 
the  Danish CO
2
 taxation scheme5, Denmark being the irst 
 member state to obtain approval of its carbon-energy taxation 
system. A system of ‘agreements’ between energy- intensive 
industries and the regulatory agencies play a role in obtaining 
tax rate reductions in the Danish scheme. The Commission’s 
guidelines relect the role of agreements  vis-à-vis selective 
tax reductions as accepted in the Danish case.
The burden for energy-intensive industries nevertheless 
remains negative, but at what scale? Company managers in 
energy-intensive industries often focus on the gross burden 
of ETR, which in energy-intensive sectors has amounted for 
up to 5% of the gross operating surplus. However, detailed 
analysis in COMETR indicates a lower net burden when con-
sidering the impact of lower payroll taxes and the energy 
eficiency gains which can be attributed speciically to the 
tax (Andersen and Ekins, 2009). While for cement and glass 
a net burden below 1% of the gross operating surplus has 
been identiied, it has for ferrous and non-ferrous metals 
reached about 2% of gross operating surplus (see Figure 6). 
In Sweden, with no reductions in employers’ social contribu-
tions, the costs are estimated to be higher and up to 4% of 
gross operating surplus.
3. TRaDING CaRbON WHIlE TaXING  
IT aT THE SaME TIME
3.1 EFFECTIVE CaRbON PRICE SIGNal  
aS a RESUlT OF THE ETS CaP ON EMISSIONS
The creation of a CO
2
 emissions trading system (ETS) in the 
European Union has created a more complex regulatory 
 environment, in which unilateral carbon-energy taxation 
and EU minimum energy tax rates now coexist with trading 
of mainly grandfathered emission certiicates for carbon. 
The EU ETS covers large installations, i.e. power plants larger 
than 20MW, as well as reineries and certain  energy-intensive 
industries, notably ferrous metals,  cement, glass,  ceramic 
products as well as pulp and  paper. Member states can  extend 
the trading system to other  energy-intensive industries. The 
ETS requires member states to limit emissions to the num-
ber of allowances that their ETS installations hold, which 
may include both EU  allowances (EUA) and  certiied emission 
reductions (CER) from the clean development mechanism 
(CDM) and joint implementation projects.  National alloca-
tion plans have in most cases provided  certiicates to indus-
try that match  historical emissions, whereas allocation to 
power plants often have been restricted to  levels lower than 
 historical emissions, as power producers are able to pass on 
the  added costs to the consumer.
The carbon price signal from the scheme arises along two 
routes: direct costs may arise as emitters need to acquire 
 certiicates for additional production activities; and more im-
portantly, indirect costs arise as power producers will factor 
the opportunity costs of certiicates into electricity prices with 
a carbon shadow-cost component.
Numerous studies have investigated the pass-on rates 
from power producers of the carbon shadow-cost. The 
most  pessimistic studies assume a 100% pass-on rate, e.g. 
 McKinsey comes to a igure of 10 euro/MWh for a 20 euro/
tCO
2
 allowance price (McKinsey and ECOFYS, 2006). How-
ever, several studies show that the pass-on rate will be 
100% only during the time where power demand exceeds 
the base load and a fossil fuel plant sets the marginal price. 
In those periods where non-carbon energy carriers set the 
marginal price in the electricity market, it is not likely that 
power  operators will be able to factor in the value of the 
certiicates. One study for Germany and the Netherlands 
hence comes to a pass-on rate of 40-60% (Sijm et al., 2005). 
The International Energy Agency (IEA) points to the Nordic 
 electricity market (Nordpool) as one region where elec-
tricity trade has been successfully liberalised and where 
pass-on of ETS costs should be expected (Reinaud, 2007). 
One Finnish study concludes that due to the signiicance of 
hydro and nuclear power in Nordpool the average pass-on 
rate should be in the region of 40%, e.g. 4 euro/MWh for a 
20 euro allowance price (Honkatukia et al., 2006). 
The implication of the ETS-cap for a 20 euro/tCO
2
 alloca-
tion price hence is likely to be an induced carbon price 
in the range of 4-10 euro/MWh. In comparison carbon-
energy taxes on electricity are in the range of 6-12 euro/
MWh for smaller business users in ETR-countries with 
predominant use of fossil fuels in power generation. These 
obser vations suggest that, with effect from 2008, ETS has 
effectively  increased the CO
2
 costs per MWh to a carbon 
price level comparable to that of smaller business users 
in member states with carbon-energy taxes—a signii-
cant increase and for all consumers—also highly energy- 
intensive  industries.
5 State aid case N459/95, Oficial Journal C324, 5.12.1995
Figure 6: Energy-intensive sectors in Germany: tax burden, 
value of lower employers’ social contributions (SSC) and energy 
savings induced by the tax as percent of gross operating surplus. 
Source: COMETR database
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One important caveat with ETS, however, is that no revenue 
becomes available for recycling to reduce other taxes, and 
in contrast to ETR, that business is not compensated for the 
burden imposed with the carbon price shadow-costs from 
grandfathered emissions certiicates to electricity prices 
(for this important point see Parry, 2003). 
3.2 DOUblE-REGUlaTION WITH ETR aND ETS
Participation in ETS is a legal obligation under EU law for 
emitters in member states. The EU ETS system was intro-
duced with effect from 2005, whereas most of the unilateral 
carbon-energy taxes had been introduced before that year. 
The co-existence of unilateral carbon taxes for emitters 
 subject to cap-and-trade have evoked concerns over double 
regulation. Notably ETR-countries with taxes speciically 
aimed at CO
2
 raised the issue. 
Some complications with the avoidance of double-regulation 
have occurred because of two aspects of EU law: the state aid 
regulations and the Energy Tax Directive (ETD)6. 
The Treaty for EU Article 87 prescribes that state aid 
can only be allowed with the approval of the European 
 Commission.  According to EU case law, even reductions in 
energy taxes count as state aid, as a functional perspective 
applies. Hence, while member states are free to introduce 
unilateral carbon-energy taxes, paradoxically they must 
 obtain  Commission approval for any reductions in these. For 
this purpose the Commission has issued a set of guidelines 
which stresses that selective reductions can be a concern 
because they may violate fair terms of competition. Lifting 
CO
2
-taxes for the speciic sectors subject to ETS would in 
fact be a selective approach and Commission approval is 
not straightforward.
A further aspect to consider is the interaction with ETD, a 
 directive agreed in 2003 that introduced minimum energy tax 
rates for fuels and electricity. The purposes of ETD relate to 
energy eficiency and security of supply. The minimum tax 
rates place a loor for the tax rates that must be imposed to 
constrain energy use. Now in some cases the CO
2
-taxes had 
been seen to meet the minimum requirements for energy 
taxation, despite having a name that referred to carbon emis-
sions. If CO
2
-taxes under the impression of double regulation 
had simply been removed, there would have been no taxes in 
place to make up for the minimum rates required by ETD. For 
this reason it took several years before the Commission was 
able to sort out with member states how to adapt the unilat-
eral carbon-energy taxes to the coexistence with ETS. 
The approach now agreed is that sectors falling under ETS 
should not be subject to carbon-taxes per se, but they remain 
liable to energy taxes. In Denmark the government renamed 
the end user tax on electricity from a CO
2
-tax to an ‘energy 
savings tax’ to comply with ETD—and maintain the revenue 
stream. Non-ETS sectors continue to be subject to unilateral 
carbon taxes and no double-regulation issue has been raised 
over them.
4. CONClUSIONS 
The environmental tax reforms in European countries have 
provided empirically based insights into the implications of 
carbon-energy taxation. Many different studies, including the 
ex-post simulation with the E3ME model referred to here, 
show that the impacts on fuel consumption and emissions of 
greenhouse gases have been in the expected directions. E3ME 
indicate that they are generally small as a result of relatively 
modest changes in the tax rates (Barker et al., 2007). More 
signiicant impacts obtained in countries with higher tax rates 
indicate plausible scale effects from extended tax shifts.
In view of the controversy over a possible double dividend from 
carbon taxes and environmental tax reform, the results from 
the analysis with the E3ME-model are innovative, but do not 
suggest that the macro-economic implications of ETR are pro-
found. Rather the tax shifting seems to have had only small 
impacts on overall economic performance, even for those 
energy-intensive industries that tend to be the relative losers 
under ETR. On this point the indings are in line with other re-
cent research indings (Agnolucci, 2009). Nevertheless it may 
also be a worthwhile observation that such tax shifts could be 
implemented without dramatically negative impacts, and that 
reducing other taxes with a recycling of the revenues seems to 
play the expected role in this regard. 
In view of the inancial crisis it is likely that the  introduction 
of unilateral carbon-energy taxes will be considered by 
more countries. It will hardly be possible to maintain reve-
nue  neutrality, but increases in such taxes are likely to be 
preferable to many of the alternatives, which include further 
increases in income taxes that could be more distorting to 
overall economic performance.
6 Directive 2003/96/EC.
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